wrote of fe!odalite and lois feodales as distinguishing a state of society, thus, incidentally, expanding the concept to include a far wider range of phenomena than it had for legal scholars.5 The writers of the eighteenth century, like those of later times, assigned different meanings to the term fetodalite, or, in English, "feodality." Some used it to designate a system of government, some to refer to conditions that developed as public power disappeared. By 18oo the construct had been launched and the expression "feudal system" devised; by the mid-nineteenth century the word "feudalism" was in use. The way was prepared for future scholars to study feudalism-whatever it was conceived to be-scientifically and for others to employ the ism to refer, abusively, to those selected elements of the past that were to be overthrown, abolished, or inexorably superseded.6 SINCE THE MIDDLE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY the concepts of feudalism and the feudal system have dominated the study of the medieval past. The appeal of these words, which provide a short, easy means of referring to the European social and political situation over an enormous stretch of time, has proved virtually impossible to resist, for they pander to the human desire to grasp-or to think one is grasping-a subject known or suspected to be complex by applying to it a simple label simplistically defined. The great authority of these terms has radically influenced the way in which the history of the Middle Ages has been conceptualized and investigated, encouraging concentration on oversimplified models that are applied as standards and stimulating investigation of similarities and differences, norms and deviations. As a result scholars have disregarded or paid insufficient attention to recalcitrant data that their models do not prepare them to expect.
But let us return to Maitland. Implicit in his assessment of Spelman and the feudal system is a clear objection to applying the label "feudal system" to medieval England, presumably because of a belief that England never underwent a systematization of social and political life-or, as Maitland puts it, never experienced "the development of what can properly be called a feudal system." Less evident, perhaps, is a hesitancy about the propriety of using the phrase "feudal system" at all. That Maitland questioned the wisdom of applying it to conditions of medieval society is hard to dispute, however, for in his lectures he remarks, The phrase [feudal system] has thus become for us so large and vague that it is quite possible to maintain that of all countries England was the most, or for the The Tyranny of a Construct 1 067 element of 'feudalism' in post-Conquest England" and of "the essential continuity of English institutions."'10
Such an approach logically requires isolating those elements that can properly be called feudal from those that cannot. Since Richardson and Sayles never explicitly objectify the enemy, however, their readers are left to deduce from their arguments just what phenomena they consider essential components of feudalism. Homage, " 'feudal' incidents," honors and honorial courts, knightly service connected with fiefs, and the use of military tenures for military purposes are all linked in one way or another with feudalism, although Richardson and Sayles clearly suggest that, unless found in their Franco-Norman forms, these elements should not be considered truly feudal. Thus the authors attempt to validate their hypothesis by showing either that these or similar institutions existed in England before 1o66-and hence are to be classified as Old English and therefore not Norman feudaloir that they had no real importance after that date." In the end, coming to grips with the problem of definition, they abruptly abandon their previous criteria. So that they can pronounce England safely nonfeudal and therefore non-French, they fall back on what they call "the classical theory of feudalism," described as the idea of lordship diminished by fragmentation or of "sovereignty . . . divided between the king and his feudataries," neither of which was ever found in England. They warn that feudalism should not be defined simply in terms of tenure, since if it is it will be found everywhere.'2 As their lengthy discussion and conclusion make clear, Richardson and Sayles were never fully convinced, despite their initial volleys, that feudalism was in fact no "more than an arbitrary pattern imposed by modern writers upon men long dead and events long past." Although they end their analysis by remarking of the word "feudal" that "an adjective so ambiguous and so misleading is best avoided," their repeated use of the term belies their alleged distaste.'3 IF NUMEROUS ARGUMENTS in defense of feudalism have been advanced, "utility" and "indispensability" are the chief rallying cries of the term's defenders. Let us turn first to the criterion of utility.
In the introduction to his classic study Feudalism, F. L. Ganshof states that he intends his book to facilitate the work of students of medieval society. In analyzing and describing feudal institutions he says he has "endeavored to bring out as clearly as possible their essential features, since, once these Io68 Elizabeth A. R. Brown are grasped, it is easy for the student to disentangle the elements that can properly be described as feudal in the institutions of the period or country with which he is primarily concerned.'"1 Helping the scholar as well as the student to evaluate, analyze, and categorize the past is also important to Michael Postan, and in his foreword to the English edition of Marc Bloch's Feudal Society he argues that the usefulness of "generalized concepts" such as feudalism lies in their ability to "help us to distinguish one historical situation from another and to align similar situations in different countries and even in different periods." For Postan greater complexity apparently means greater utility, and he prefers Bloch's definition of feudalism, which embraces "most of the significant features of medieval society," to "constitutional and legal concepts of feudalism" centering on "military service" and "contractual principles." These latter concepts, he feels, may have some virtue as pedagogical devices, to promote "intellectual discipline," and to serve as "an antidote to the journalistic levities of modern historiography." Still, they cannot validly be considered "an intellectual tool, to be used in the study of society."'15
If Postan draws a rather unsettling distinction between pedagogy on the one hand and research and sound intellectual endeavor on the other, it is clear that he is not alone in considering appropriate for the student what is decried for the scholar. This "track" approach to feudalism is widespread, even though those who espouse it may differ concerning what should be taught at different levels. Postan envisions progression from a partial to a more complex model, always retaining the term "feudalism" to denote the model. Others, expressing fundamental objections to the misleading impression of simplicity and system they believe inevitably associated with isms, still argue that authors of basic textbooks-as opposed to advanced studieswould be lost without the concept of feudalism. This rather inconsistent attitude apparently springs from two convictions: first, that beginning students are incapable of dealing with complex and diverse development and must for their own good be presented with an artificially regular schema; and second, that the term "feudalism" somehow helps these students by serving as a handy, familiar tag to which to attach consciously oversimplified generalizations. Later, as graduate students, they are presumably to be introduced to qualifications and complications, and finally, as scholars and initiates into the mysteries of the trade, they are to be encouraged to discard the offending ism for purposes of research, if not for purposes of teaching their own beginning students. Charles r. Wood, although not explicitly endorsing the use of the term "feudalism," writes that "the feudal pyramid. . . makes for clear diagrams, and schoolboys have to begin somewhere."
The Tyranny of a Construclt 1 o6 Still, he admnits, "whiere they do begin is rather far removed from reality."'6 Postani, and presumably Ganshof, feels that employing the construct has the virtue of enabling scholars to distinguislh likenesses among different times and areas. Similarly John Le Patourel advocates formulating a definition of feudalism that could be used "as a measuring-rod, "'17 and such a standard couild presumably be relied on not only, as hie wants, to clarify "4the old argument" over the introduction of feudalism into England but also, as Postan argues, to advance the work of those concerned with comparing developments in different countries.
If feutdalism is praised as a teaching device and as a means of understanding societies, it is also said to be "indispensable," and that for a number of reasons. Marc Bloch maintains that scientists cannot function without abstractions and that since historians are scientists, they also require abstractions. The specific abstractions "feudal" and "feudalism" are defended on the grouinds that, however awkward and inappropriate in terms of their original connotations these words and others like them may be, the historian is in this respect no worse off than the scientist, who mutst also make do with inconvenient and unsuitable terminology.18 Michael Postan goes beyond Blochi to declare that "without generalized terms representing entire groups of phenomena not only history buit all intelligent discourse would be impossible," and he maintains that no difference exists between stuch a word as "feudalismn" and other general terms like "war" and "agriculture."'9 Equally positively, if less aggressively, Fredric Cheyette has insisted that the term-"feudalism" cannot "simply be discarded-the verbal detours one would have to make to replace it would be strained as well as disingenuous. 20 Otto Hintze argues that the concept is indispensable not only for reasons of practicality and convenience but also because of the deficiencies of the processes of human thought, assumed to be incapable of comprehending the complexities of tthe real world. Hintze asserts that since "it is impossible to grasp the complicated circumstances of historical life, so laden with unique occurrences, in a few universal and unamnbiguious concepts-as is l6 Woo's own description of medieval society deals with htuman ings rather than schemas, but he occasionally uses the terms "feudal" anid "fetudalism," which are not defined. Even its most eloquent advocates readily acknowledge the difficulties associated with the use of the term "feudalism.," Marc Bloch, for one, states that "nearly every historian understands the word as he pleases," and "even if we do define, it is usually every man for himself." He admits that the word is charged with emotional overtones22 and is in fact "very ill-chosen,"23 and he acknowledges that, in general, abstractions which are "ill-chosen or too mechanically applied" should be avoided.'24 He goes so far as to declare that the word "capitalism" has lost its usefulness because it has become burdened with ambiguities and because it is "carelessly applied to the most diverse civilizations," so that, as a result, "it almost inevitably results in concealing their original features.' '25 Even Postan, whose loyalty to Bloch exceeds Bloch's sense of commitment to his own ideas, grants that comprehensive terms like "feudalism" "over-simplify the reality they purport to epitomize," and he confesses that in some contexts the practice of giving general names to whole epochs can even be dangerous, [ Calling it "un mouvement de tres grande amplitude," he does not define it precisely and explicitly, although he says that it was characterized by "la decomposition de l'autorit, of sorts, reconciling the definitions of Strayer and Ganshof. Later, however, Duby turned from government and land to mentalities, and in 1958 he suggested that feudalism might best be considered a psychological complex formed in the small world of warriors who little by little became nobles. A consciousness of the superiority of a status characterized by military specialization, one that presupposes respect for certain moral precepts, the practice of certain virtues; the associated idea that social relations are organized as a function of companionship in combat; notions of homage, of personal dependence, now in the foreground, replacing all previous forms of political association.37
Definitions of feudalism abound, and student and scholar have available to them broad ones that lump together numerous facets of medieval society and narrow ones that center on carefully chosen aspects of that societytenurial, political, military, and psychical. The possibilities for bewilderment and dispute are dizzying, particularly since a single author's interpretation of the term can undergo marked shifts.
Another difficulty posed by feudalism and its system is the fact that those employing the terms, in whatever sense they use them, are constantly found qualifying and limiting the extent to which they believe them applicable to any particular time and locality in medieval Europe. Marc Bloch writes, In the area of Western civilization the map of feudalism reveals some large blank spaces the Scandinavian peninsula, Frisia, Ireland. Perhaps it is more important still to note that feudal Europe was not all feudalized in the same degree or according to the same rhythm and, above all, that it was nowhere feudalized completely.
Nostalgically, and with regret only a confirmed Platonist could harbor, he concludes, "No doubt it is the fate of every system of human institutions never to be more than imperfectly realized.' '38 While Robert S. Hoyt could write of the growth and development of feudalism and could state that by the mid-eleventh century "an essentially feudal society had emerged throughout western continental Europe," he felt obliged, first, to deny that there was a " 'feudal system' common to all Europe," and second, to assert that "there were endless diversity and variety."39 In the introduction to Feudalism Ganshof notes that he proposes monarchique" and coincided with the development off a new sort of warfare and the establishment of a new conception of peace; he discusses "un systeme economique que l'on peut, en simplifiant, appeler feodal"; he concludes that "au plan de l'economie, la f6odalit6 n'est pas seulement la hierarchie des conditions sociales qu'entend representer le schema des trois ordres [elsewhere described as le clerge, les specialistes de la guerre, to study feudalism mainly as it existed in France, in the kingdom of BurgundyArles and in Germany, since in these countries its characteristics were essentially the same, and to concentrate on the regions lying between the Loire and the Rhine, which were the heart of the Carolingian state and the original home of feudalism. Further afield, in the south of France and in Germany beyond the Rhine, the institutions that grew up are often far from typical of feudalism as a whole.40
In his foreword to the book, F. M. Stenton praises Ganshof's self-imposed limitations and suggests that they result from a realization "that social arrangements, arising from the instinctive search for a tolerable life, vary indefinitely with varieties of time and circumstance." While it is easy to agree with Stenton that students should be disabused of the idea that "an ideal type of social order" dominated Western Europe, it comes as something of a shock to find him readily accepting the doctrine that in the huge area on which Ganshof focuses a single "classical feudalism" was to be found. 41 The expectation of infinite variety in social arrangements seemingly ends for Stenton at the Loire and the Rhine, a good safe distance from the Thames. The variety of definitions of feudalism and the limitations imposed on their relevance are confusing. Equally disconcerting is the pervasive tendency on the part of those who use the word to personify, reify, and to coin two words, occasionally "bacterialize," and even "lunarize" the abstraction. How often does one read that feudalism, like a virus, spread from one area to another, or that, later on, it slowly waned. In a single study feudalism is assigned a dazzling array of roles. It is found giving birth, being extremely virile, having vitality, being strong, knowing a long tradition, being successfully transplanted, surviving, being replaced, teetering, being routed, declining and falling, and finally dead and in its grave. Another author sees it destroying the Frankish Empire and making a clean sweep of outmoded institutions. For another it makes onslaughts on the power of the kings of France and England; "les forces feodaux" end the confusion of spiritual and temporal authorities. Still another work reassuringly attributes a home to feudalism, which is said to have exercised, rather adventurously, "paralyzing action" over "many forms of royal activity," and, more decorously, to have been "introduced into England in its French form" by the duke of judgments, but such assessments are ordinarily expressed in value-loaded terms. To say that a person or a group is attempting to live up to or realize a standard certainly suggests virtuous dedication on the part of the people in question. To declare that a country which is not feudalized is lagging behind is to indicate that the area is in some sense backward. Even more evidently evaluative are such expressions as decayed, decadent, and bastard feudalism, all of them implying a. society's failure or inability to maintain pure principles that were once upheld.19 One is occasionally struck by a rather sentimental regret that the societies, individuals, and groups which might have been encouraged by high marks to persevere or shamed by low ones into exerting an additional push are unable to benefit from them. Even if formulated in value-free terms, analyses of societies on the basis of their conformity to or deviation from a norm offer little insight into the societies themselves, however much the process of comparison may stimulate and challenge the ingenuity of historians. To produce helpful insights, comparative history must involve the examination of the widest possible range of elements, not those idiosyncratically dubbed essential by the historians devising the standard to be applied.
Asserting that individual rulers actively and consciously aimed at estab-. lishing feudalism and judging them in terms of this aim is, at another level, equally misconceived and misleading. That William the Conqueror, the' Normans, and the Crusaders wanted to establish control within the areas they conquered as effectively as circumstances permitted is, I think, unquestionable; that they used and molded the institutional forms and arrangements with which they were familiar and which were available to them is equally undeniable. To suggest, however, that they operated on the basis of a definite, preconceived scheme focused primarily on the fief, and to measure their accomplishments by such a standard, is to give a distorted, manipulated a variety of institutional devices to achieve their purposes a degree of calculation, narrowness of vision, and rigidity that the surviving evidence does not suggest characterized them and in which even a contemporary management specialist might have difficulty believing.
What of the other virtues attributed to feudalism as a means of comprehending medieval social and political life? As far as pedagogy is concerned, students should certainly be spared an approach that inevitably gives an unwarranted impression of unity and systematization and unduly emphasizes, owing to the etymology of the word, the significance of the fief. Even if historians agreed to define feudalism as feudal society and included within its scope all facets of social and political development, the practical problem would remain. There are other, more basic, disadvantages.
To advocate teaching what is acknowledged to be deceptive and what must later be untaught reflects an unsettling attitude of condescension toward younger students. Furthermore, not only does such a procedure waste the time of teacher and student, but its supporters apparently disregard the difficulty of, as a student of mine puts it, "'erasing' an erroneous concept or fact from the mind of a child who has been taught it, mistakenly or intentionally, at a lower school level." This student, Marie Heinbach, who teaches social studies in a New York junior high school, goes on to point out that "the difficulty becomes almost insurmountable when the amazing retentive powers of a young and impressionable child are considered. In addition, as the amount of time between the learning and unlearning of a concept increases, it becomes nearly impossible totally to correct the misconceptions that a student may have."50 Experts who knowingly mislead their students appear to be-unsure of their own ability to present a simplified account of the conclusions concerning medieval society that historians have now reached. Those of their students who do not progress beyond the introductory stage are denied the knowledge that most medieval historians study the actions and interrelationships of human beings rather than concentrating on the formulation and refinement of definitions of abstractions. Such students are never exposed to the problems of social and family structure and their corresponding etiquettes or to the problems of territorial loyalties and group attachments that historians are now examining. Presented with an abstract model and sternly cautioned against assuming its general relevance and applicability, only the staunchest will be motivated to pursue the individuals and groups lurking behind and beyond the ism.
For scholars the approach has equally little use. Applying an artificially fabricated standard in which certain components are divorced from the context in which they existed is essentially sterile. And those who investigate the workings of medieval society run the risk of having their vision narrowed, their perspective anachronistically skewed, and their receptivity to divergent data consequently blunted unless they firmly divorce themselves from the preconceptions and sets associated with the oversimplified models and abstractions with which they have been indoctrinated and which they themselves pass on to their students.
What of the indispensability of feudalism? Here a distinction must be made. While the creation of intuitive abstractions and simple Ideal Types can indeed be explained by invoking the infinite and confusing variety of human experience, it is quite another matter to suggest that the procedure is obligatory, necessary, or laudable. Alternative modes of classifying and describing exist and can be used. Again, attempting to justify the formulation and use of such models and abstractions by maintaining that scholarly and scientific terminology and common usage assume their existence is patently circular, avoiding as this argument does the obvious fact that scholarly terminology can be revised and common usage clarified. Far more appropriate to express regret and to apologize for measures attributable to the weaknesses and defects of human modes of expression and perception. Historians and social scientists can, like natural scientists, devise multifactor, heuristic models that encompass and account for the available evidence, are reformulated to include newly discovered data, and are not misleadingly labeled so as to suggest either system and conscious organization where none existed or the predominant importance of one element in a situation in which many elements are known to have been significant.51 Such multifactor models and descriptive, narrative accounts, which emphasize complexity and the unique, can convincingly be said to encourage fuller, less distorted, and hence more acceptable understanding of the past than any "one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view."52
The contention that such general terms as "feudalism" are essential for intelligent discourse is also debatable, and those who advance this defense reveal their own discomfiture when they invoke other commonly used abstractions, such as "war" and "agriculture," to serve as buttressing middle elements. Intelligent discourse devoid of general abstract terms is, the argument runs, inconceivable. All abstractions-feudalism, war, agriculture-are similar in nature. Therefore the isms are indispensable if intelligent discourse is to occur. This chain of reasoning is, however, flawed in its second step, for there is an evident difference between, on the one hand, those collective descriptive abstractions arrived at by isolating common features of different phenomena similar enough to permit the use and assure the acceptance of single words to denote them, and, on the other hand, those abstract analytic constructs formulated and defined as a shorthand means of designating the characteristics that the observers consider essential to various time periods, modes of organization, movements, and doctrines. To a degree to. which the first type is not, the second sort of general term is inevitably and often intentionally affected by the theories and assumptions of the formulators and users. Disagreements over the exact meaning of "war" or "agriculture" do occur, but they can ordinarily be resolved by introducing greater precision and clarity into the definitions of the terms, whose core signification is not generally contested. In distinction, infinite disagreement about the meanings of the isms is possible and perhaps inevitable, since the terms were not devised to designate the basic elements of fundamentally similar classes of phenomena but rather to refer to selected elements of complex phenomena, the choice of which inevitably involves the idiosyncratic value judgments of the terms' inventors and employers. Thus, however easy it is to say what the words "fief,"
capital," and "merchant" mean, it is an.other thing entirely to seek consensus on the definitions of "feudalism," "capitalism," and "mercantilism," precisely because of the subjective nature of the definitions of these words. To raise the level of discourse and make it truly intelligent, there should be general agreement to consider the isms no more than the artificialities they are.
DIRECT EXPRESSIONS OF DISCONTENT with the term "feudalism" have increased in number and strength over the past two decades. From time to time there has seemed reason to hope that, with a resounding whoop, historians would join together, following the example of the National Assembly, to annihilate the feudal regime and, with the good members of the Legion of Honor, agree "to combat . . any enterprise tending to reestablish it."'53 At least partly responsible for the mounting volume of protest is the reorientation of perspective that took place in 1953 with the publication of two remarkable books, one French and one English, both dealing with the political and social life of Western Europe in the tenth through the twelfth centuries, both concerned with individuals rather than abstractions, and both avoiding the medieval isms.
Of these books the purest-in that it does not, as far as I can tell, contain the word "feudalism"-is Richard W. Southern's study, The Making of the Middle Ages. In a section devoted to "The Bonds of Society" Southern presents an illuminating introduction to the political life of the eleventh and twelfth centuries by concentrating on a single, "unusually The Tyranny of a Construct io8i towns and active commercial oligarchies were not conspicuous." Discussing the emergence of the county of Anjou, Southern uses such abstract terms as "the disintegration of authority" and "the shaping of a new political order." He writes, generally, of "an age of serious, expansive wars waged by well-organized and strongly fortified territorial lords." The term "feudal" is sometimes used in a general sense, in contexts in which it clearly implies more than connection or involvement with the fief. When the term is given this broader meaning, however, it seems to be so used out of force of habit rather than from any conscious conviction that it is the most appropriate and meaningful word to be found. "The art of feudal government" and "the early feudal age," neither phrase explicitly defined by Southern, are reminiscent of Bloch's La Societe fetodale, a book Southern recommends, and they strike a jarring note of vagueness and imprecision in a discussion otherwise notable for its concreteness. On the few other occasions when Southern employs the term "feudal" in this general way, alternative expressions that he devises to describe the phenomena in question are strikingly more informative. "Knightly" is one of these alternative terms, and, on a more extended scale, "the straightforward feudal-contract view of society" is far less subtle and suggestive than his evocative descrip- Stressing the survival of comital power and superiority until the end of the tenth century, Duby shows that among the higher ranks of society the ties of fidelity linking those agreeing to some sort of mutual support were vague and imprecise, like family ties, and can best be described as confirming a relationship of amicitia. As the count's power declined and as that of the castellans increased, bonds of dependence among the higher classes became more important, and grants of land were used to solidify the ties until by-1075 land outweighed loyalty as their determinant. Obligations were still indefinite, however, and military service was not a significant component. Between men of unequal status, dependent relationships were closer, but the strength and meaning of these ties were limited by the small value of the fiefs that lords gave their followers, who generally possessed large allodial holdings, and by the multiplicity of the ties. According to Duby, "feudal institutions"-by which he apparently means not only fiefs but also homage and vassalage-had only superficial, importance. They constituted a sort of superstructure that formalized without affecting pre-existing relationships.
Feudal institutions were adapted to the previous structure of the higher class without significantly modifying it. Between great lords or knights, homage is a simple guarantee, an agreement not to harm; between a small noble and a powerful one, it is a true dedication, an agreement to serve. Vassalage and the fief, customary practices born in private usage, organized the relations that unequal division of wealth and power had already determined; they created no additional ones. In eleventh-century Maconnais, there was no pyramid of vassals, there was no feudal system.57 Duby concludes that for the higher classes "feudalism was a step toward anarchy," but by this he evidently means not that any ill-conceived and abortive attempt had been made to create harmony by introducing homage, vassalage, and the fief, but that the links ordered by these institutions were not strong or meaningful enough to serve as effective restraints. These were instead provided by the teachings and intervention of the Church, by family bonds, and by a variety of oaths. Thus, "although violent and disturbed, the world of lords was not anarchic.'58 In this period the nobility exercised Having begun by declaring that "few historical labels are more ambiguous than 'feudal'" and by proclaiming that he would therefore "use it as little as possible," having then warned that "it is doubtful whether [strict feudalism] ever existed outside the imaginations of historians," he proceeds, without defining the term "feudal," to use it, imprecisely and ambiguously, in writing of "the feudal bond," "feudal conceptions," "the feudal contract," "the feudal oath," and "feudal and quasi-feudal institutions." He also refers to "highly developed" feudalism, "classical feudalism," "French feudalism," and "strict feudalism." Finally he both reifies feudalism and uses the phrase "coherent feudalism" to designate a consciously formulated and adopted set of goals and principles.69 THE HESITANCIES,
CONTRADICTIONS, AND INCONSISTENCIES
that have been reviewed-and that are wholly typical of statements found in the books on medieval society published in the past twenty years-clearly demonstrate how necessary it is to reassess the value of the words "feudal" and "feudalism." It must be admitted that there is little possibility of ridding the historical vocabulary of them, adopted as they have been by the scholarly community in general and by the economists in particular. The terms exist. They have been and probably will be used for many years. As words students know if they know nothing else about the Middle Ages, they cannot be avoided. But confrontation need not mean capitulation, for it is perfectly possible to instruct students at all levels to use "feudal" only with specific reference to fiefs and to teach them what feudalism is, always has been, and always will be-a construct devised in the seventeenth century and then and subsequently used by lawyers, scholars, teachers, and polemicists to refer to phenomena, generally associated more or less closely with the Middle Ages, but always and inevitably phenomena selected by the person employing the term and reflecting that particular viewer's biases, values, and orientations. Illustrations of the many meanings attached to "feudal" and "feudalism" can be given, and students with a flair for historiography can be encouraged to explore the eccentricities of usage associated with the terms. Other students will be directed to the study of medieval society and politics, and they and their instructors will be faced with the necessity and challenge of finding an adequate means of describing the elements historians have investigated and should explore and the positive conclusions that have been reached.70 Throughout, the terminology and word usage of those who
